Optimality criteria of hybrid inflation-price level targeting (outdated version) by Bokor, László
MPRA
Munich Personal RePEc Archive
Optimality criteria of hybrid
inflation-price level targeting (outdated
version)
La´szlo´ Bokor
September 2007
Online at https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/25356/
MPRA Paper No. 25356, posted 26. September 2010 17:51 UTC
 1 
OPTIMALITY CRITERIA OF HYBRID INFLATION-PRICE LEVEL 
TARGETING 
 
László Bokor 
Department of Finance and Accounting 
Budapest University of Technology and Economics 
bokor@finance.bme.hu 
 
First version: September 2007 
Current version: September 2008 
 
This paper provides a comprehensive analysis of the relative performance of inflation targeting, price level 
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The difference between the policy of inflation targeting and price level targeting can be 
captured in their attitude to shocks affecting price level. In most general terms, inflation 
targeting attempts to maintain a targeted inflation path, and does not care for unanticipated 
misses in the past which implies the rising uncertainty around the future price level. Price 
level targeting attempts to maintain a targeted price path which implies that uncertainty 
around the price level does not increase with the progress of time.1 In others words, inflation 
targeting is a regime without memory, while price level targeting is a history-dependent 
policy. 
A fixed price level has reasonable benefits. Planning and contracting becomes easier as 
nominal values become real values. The information message of prices is without any 
distortion, since their realignments would purely reflect scarcity, which enhances the resource 
allocation mechanism. The continuous transfer of welfare from the cash holders to the 
government using inflation device (not just surprise inflation!) is also wiped out. However, 
the idea of price level targeting has been criticized from both practical and theoretical 
standpoint.2 The “conventional wisdom”, as Svensson (1999) named it, states that the 
consequence of price level stabilization is the higher volatility of inflation and output gap.3 
“The intuition is straightforward: In order to stabilize the price level under price-level 
targeting, higher-than-average inflation must be succeeded by lower-than-average inflation. 
This should result in higher inflation variability than inflation targeting, since in the latter 
case, base level drift is accepted and higher-than-average inflation need only be succeeded by 
                                               
1
 With a constant inflation target, inflation is stationary, while the (log of) price level has a unit root. If the 
inflation target is zero, the (log of ) price level follows random walk, if it is a positive value, then the (log of) 
price level follows a stochastic trend. With a constant price level target, the (log of) price level is stationary 
around the targeted value, and inflation is stationary, too, around zero. If the (log of) targeted price path has a 
constant positive slope, then the (log of) price level is trend stationary as it follows a deterministic trend, and 
inflation becomes stationary around the slope of the (log of) targeted price path. 
2
 Fischer (1994) argues that since indexed financial assets and nominal contracting are given, targeted price level 
has not too much sense. McCallum (1999) claims that the abovementioned benefits would not be significant in 
the United States. 
3
 Svensson (1999) refered to the writings of Lebow, Roberts and Stockton (1992), Fischer (1994), and Haldane 
and Salmon (1995). 
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average inflation. Via nominal rigidities, the higher inflation variability should then result in 
higher output variability.”4 Svensson (1999) pointed out that the root of the conventional 
comprehensive results arises from the usage of postulated reaction functions instead of 
endogenous decision rules. He showed, using a New Classical Phillips curve, that under 
discretion price level targeting provides lower inflation variability, than inflation targeting 
does, without affecting the output gap variability at the same time, if there is sufficiently high 
persistence in the output gap. He called this “free lunch”. Vestin (2006) made this comparison 
in a New Keynesian economy, assuming perfectly credible central banks. He demonstrated 
that free lunch result holds, even if there is no endogenous output gap persistence, and if there 
is no persistence in cost-push shocks, price level targeting can implement commitment 
solution. With exogenous inflation persistence, price level targeting can be also better than 
inflation targeting, though the key issue is the assignment of proper preference weight in the 
loss function of the central bank.5 
As Woodford (2000) emphasized, the optimal policy under commitment is history-dependent 
in the case of forward looking expectations. However, since it is generally time-inconsistent, 
it does not provide a too realistic solution.6 The point is to implement such a discretionary 
policy, that can incorporate the past in the decision making process. A predetermined price 
level target operates as a solid nominal anchor, and incorporates history dependent policy. 
Under New Classical Phillips curve, current inflation-output gap trade off is not affected by 
inflation expectations, as they are predetermined. However, as Barnett and Engineer (2001) 
explained, with the existence of sufficiently high persistence in the output gap, rational actors 
indirectly form their expectations in a forward looking manner, as they know the future 
persistency effects of the current output gap affecting the trade off. In a New Keynesian 
economy the relation is more straightforward, as here inflation expectations affect inflation-
output gap trade-off right in the present, and so the gains of a credible price level target arise 
immediately. 
Since efficiency of price level targeting and inflation targeting is sensitive to the key 
assumptions on, for instance, expectations, several examinations were concluded with 
creating more generalized economic environments and implementing new hybrid policies. 
Batini and Yates (2003) analyzed such a hybrid regime that combines the characteristics of 
inflation targeting and price level targeting, incorporating the weighted average of inflation 
and price level target into the central bank’s loss function. Under hybrid inflation 
expectations, they concluded that hybrid targeting is good when policy rules are set in a 
forward looking manner. Cechetti and Kim (2005) also showed that in an economy 
represented by a New Classical Phillips curve with high output gap persistence, an 
appropriately chosen hybrid target results in optimal policy. Nessen and Vestin (2005) 
demonstrated, using a New Keynesian Phillips curve, that a policy targeting the average 
inflation of several forthcoming periods provides better performance than inflation targeting, 
but worse than price level targeting.7 They also showed, using a hybrid Phillips curve, that if 
backward pricing more and more characterizes the economy, then the benefits of price level 
targeting deteriorates, and average inflation targeting will offer the best solution out of the 
three discretional regimes, until the economy becomes fully backward looking. 
                                               
4
 Svensson (1999), p. 278 
5
 Svensson (1999) derived his results using the same preference weight in the loss functions of price level 
targeting and inflation targeting. 
6
 Woodford’s (1999) concept of “timeless perspective” ignores the initial conditions of the regime, eventuate in 
commitment policy that is time-consistent. 
7
 Note, price level targeting is a policy that targets average inflation of infinite periods, while inflation targeting 
aims the ”average” of one period ahead only. 
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The model to be introduced in Section 1 presents a frame that incorporates multiple economic 
phenomena inducing quite different policy implications. Section 2 and 3 provides 
comprehensive analysis under different economic circumstances, beginning with the least 
realistic case up to the most general case. Section 4 gives a brief empirical outlook related to 
the results, while Section 5 concludes. 
 
 
1. The model 
 
1.1. The economy 
 
Suppose that inflation in the economy is determined by factors presented in the following 
hybrid Phillips curve,8 
 
 1| 1(1 )t t t t t tx upi φpi φ pi δ+ −= + − + + , (1) 
 
 1( )t tx f instruments −= , 
 
where (in a logarithm) tpi  is the inflation rate, 1|t tpi +  is the forward looking rational inflation 
expectation, 1tpi −  is the backward looking adaptive inflation expectation, tx  is the output gap, 
tu  is an AR(1) disturbance term, 1t t tu uρ ε−= + , where tε  is an i.i.d. with zero mean and 
variance of 2σ , and , ,φ δ ρ  are constants ( 0 1≤ ≤φ , 0δ > ); φ  gives the composition of the 
expectations of the actors in economy, while δ  shows the slope of the Phillips curve, and ρ  
indicates the persistence of the exogenous supply shock.9 
What does this Phillips curve consider and what does it not cover? Inflation is influenced by 
three factors on a general basis: expectations, shocks, and cyclic factors. The model captures 
various expectation structures, exogenous and persistent supply shocks, and it also considers 
monetary transmission lag. As shocks affecting potential output and aggregate demand are not 
modelled, the value of tx  is unambiguously determined by the monetary instruments set 
before the period, namely on the basis of the information in period t-1. Although tx  is under 
the perfect control of the central bank, actually, it can respond to a current shock only in the 
next periods only. It follows that contrary to the prevalent assumption of the topic literature, 
the central bank has not perfect control over inflation in periods when a cost-push shock 
occurs.10 Therefore, as there is no uncertainty around the output gap, it is supposed that the 
output gap itself is the instrument. 
Both endogenous and exogenous inflation persistence stand in accordance with the general 
perception that the inflation process has inertia, however, they presume widely different 
policy implications. Furthermore, the lowered reaction capability of the central bank reflects 
that monetary actions exert their full impact in a longer time. On the other hand, this model 
implies that the clearing of labour market works at its best: without monetary intervention, the 
output immediately returns to its natural level, meaning that the output gap is not persistent. 
                                               
8
 Notation |i jq  is used instead of j iE q . Both denote the expected value of the variable q at time i conditional 
upon information available in time j. 
9
 First-order autoregressive persistent shock term is presented in Clarida et al. (1999). 
10
 Svensson (1999), Cechetti and Kim (2003), Nessen and Vestin (2005), Vestin (2006) all assumed that the 
central bank has perfect control over inflation with the concurrent change of the output gap, while Batini and 
Yates (2003) used backward looking IS function. 
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1.2. The regimes 
 
We consider four regimes, the theoretical benchmark and three discretional solutions, namely 
inflation targeting with commitment, inflation targeting, price level targeting, and a hybrid 
regime of the latter two. Standard quadratic loss functions used in the literature generally 
incorporate the inflation, output gap, and seldom the nominal interest rate variability, and can 
be derived from a general equilibrium model with monopolistically competitive firms.11 
Svensson (1999) replaced the inflation target to price level target in the standard loss function, 
which eventuated in price level targeting. 
Under inflation targeting with commitment (ITC), the central bank makes a precommitment to 
its future actions, and optimizes in the initial period only. This theoretical benchmark solution 
minimizes the intertemporal social loss function itself, which is 
 
 
1 1 * 2 *
1 1
1 ( ) ( )
2
t t
t t t t t
t t
E L E x xβ β pi pi λ
∞ ∞
− −
= =
 = − + − ∑ ∑ . (2) 
 
In the case of inflation targeting (IT) the central bank tries to pursue the targeted value of 
inflation and output gap, namely to minimize the expected loss 
 
 
1 1 * 2 *
1 1
1
ˆˆ ( ) ( )
2
t t
t t t t t
t t
E L E x xβ β pi pi λ
∞ ∞
− −
= =
 = − + − ∑ ∑  (3) 
 
in every period. In a price level targeting regime (PT), the central bank tries to neutralize the 
divergence from the targeted price level and output gap, namely aims to minimize the loss 
function 
 
 
1 1 * 2 * 2
1 1
1 ( ) ( )
2
t t
t t t t t
t t
E L E p p x xβ β λ
∞ ∞
− −
= =
 = − + − ∑ ∑   (4) 
 
in every period. If inflation, output gap, and price level are incorporated in such a way that the 
weighted mixture of the inflation and price level targets are used in the loss function, we 
obtain hybrid targeting (HT). In this case, the loss function to be minimized in every period is 
 
 
1 1 * * 2 * 2
1 1
1 ((1 ) ) ((1 ) )) ( )
2
t t
t t t t t t t
t t
E L E p p x xβ β θ pi θ θ pi θ λ
∞ ∞
− −
= =
 = − + − − + + − ∑ ∑

, (5) 
 
where 0 1< <θ . It is perceivable that if 0θ = , we get to IT, and if 1θ = , then we get to PT.12 
The λ  reflects the relative importance of output gap variability compared to the importance 
of inflation variability. Different notations express that the central bank’s preference weight 
can and usually do differ from the society’s preference weight. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                               
11
 See Rotemberg and Woodford (1997). 
12
 As Batini and Yates (2003) noted referring to Larry Ball and Frank Smets, this weighting method incorporates 
the covariance term between inflation and price level into the loss function. 
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1.3. The three-period analytical frame 
 
The frame to be presented is examining a steady state to steady state economy which is hit by 
a single shock ( tε ) at the beginning of the first period. Suppose that the significance of the 
events in each period is equivalent ( 1β = ). In period 0, the economy is in steady state, where 
the variables ( tpi  and tx ) are equal to zero, and for simplicity, price level ( tp ) starts from 
zero, too.13 Another simplifying assumption is the zero inflation target ( *tpi ), in the case of 
ITC and IT, and the zero price level target ( *tp ) in the case of PT. Supposing that economy 
works on its long time potential, neither discretional regimes endeavour to aim an output level 
differing from the potential one in any case creating surprise inflation ( * 0tx = ), namely there 
is no inflation bias described by Kydland and Prescott (1977) and Barro and Gordon (1983).14 
Thus, the scope of the examination is on stabilization bias, originating also from dynamic 
inconsistency. In practice, none of the monetary regimes can temporize the pursuing of 
previously communicated targets without deteriorating credibility, but the scale is largely 
depend on what the economic actors surmise on the reliability of the central bank.15 
Eventually, excess recalibration of the path of the targeted variable erodes the trust in the 
declared policy for sure. In this sense, the model covers the time horizon where declared 
targets should be achieved maintaining credibility, with other words where the immanent 
characteristics of the regimes are clearly revealed, nothing but in ‘low resolution’. 
Accordingly, the three discretional regimes focus solely on the declared goals, that is 
inflation, price level, and hybrid targets ( ˆ 0λ λ λ= = = ); it provides the most consistent way 
of assuming high credibility gains in the absence of commitment technology. Thus, suppose 
that discretional regimes have the credibility in point of reaching their final goals considering 
rational actors, that is the forward looking economic actors fully understand the nature of the 
regime, and trust in the pursuing of the declared target.16 The expectations can be formalized 
to 
 
 1| 1|t t t t tp ppi + += − , (6) 
 
where 1|t tp +  means the expected price level of the next period. These expectations manifest in 
different manner, depending on the characteristics of the discretional regime. In IT, the actors 
expect that a zero inflation target is pursued, namely that the price level of next period will be 
the same as in the concurrent period ( 1|t t tp p+ = ). In PT, it is believed that monetary actions 
are in order to assure the targeted price level, namely zero ( *1| 0t tp p+ = = ). What do the actors 
of the economy expect in HT? It depends what emphasis the price level target bears, namely 
                                               
13
 Setting the initial price level and the target to zero theoretically implies the existence of negative prices. 
However, it serves only the better comparability of inflation and price level responses. 
14
 Since there are no market imperfections causing higher market clearing unemployment rate compared to the 
“natural” one, no incentive remains at all to aim an output level differing from the potential one. 
15
 In the 1990s, early inflation targeters were criticized because inflation target, which meant disinflation at that 
time, was in the foreground causing higher unemployment rate; however that was the way of gaining credibility. 
After successful disinflation, secondary goals (e.g. output, interest rate, exchange rate) started to move into the 
foreground. With built-up credibility, the counter-actions to mitigate a potential shock as soon as possible were 
and are used less frequently, and gradual approach is emphasized. 
16
 It is quite obvious that an inflation target or a constant price level target is easier to be communicated than a 
positive-slope price level target or even more than a hybrid target. More transparency may result more 
credibility, however we do not draw any distinction between the examined discretional regimes in this regard. 
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from the grade of ‘history dependency’. In every period, they expect that θ  proportion of the 
inflation occurred in the first period will be undone, or in other words, their expected price 
level target will be 
 
 1| 1 1 1(1 )t tp p θpi θ pi+ = − = − . (7) 
 
With this model specification, since backward pricing excludes credibility matters, 
expectations are driven by policy framework and formed exogenously at same time. With the 
assumptions given, at latest in the fourth period steady state should be achieved. Model 
calibration has been summarized in Table 1, while the solutions of the model are presented by 
Table 2 (details in Appendix A). 
 
Table 1 
Set of variables 
     Period (t) 
 
Variable 
0 1 2 3 4 
tpi  0 1pi  2pi  0 0 
tx  0 0 2x  3x  0 
tp  0 1pi  1 2pi pi+  1 2pi pi+  1 2pi pi+  
*
tpi , 
*
tx , 
*
tp  0 0 0 0 0 
tε  0 1ε  0 0 0 
tu  0 1ε  1ρε  2 1ρ ε  0 
 
In period 3, because of the existence of lagged price term, inflation should be zero in order to 
ensure steady state in period 4. However, it is only a constraint for the commitment solution, 
and not for any discretional case, as they strictly achieve their declared monotargets at latest 
at the end of period 2 (see Appendix A). 
As the disturbance term is an AR(1) process, it calms down within the progress of time. Here, 
a ‘quick’ calm down feature is used, as its effects from period 4 are disregarded. It has no 
relevance in our analysis, since from period 4, it would affect all regimes in the same manner. 
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Table 2 
Results 
 IT PT HT 
1pi  1ε  
1
1
ε
φ+  
1
1
ε
θφ+  
2pi  0 
1
1
ε
φ− +  1 1
θ
ε
θφ
 
−  + 
 
2x  ( )1 1ε φ ρδ− − +  
1 2
1
ε φ ρδ φ
 −
− + 
+ 
 
1 1
1
ε θ φ ρδ θφ
 + −
− + 
+ 
 
3x  
21ε ρδ−  
21 1
1
ε φ ρδ φ
 −
− 
+ 
 
21 (1 )
1
ε θ φ ρδ θφ
 −
− 
+ 
 
 ITC 
1pi  
2 2 2 2
2 2
2
1
2 2 2 2 2 2
2 2
1 (1 ) 1 (1 )
(1 ) (1 )
1 11 (1 ) 1 (1 ) 1
1 (1 ) 1 (1 )(1 (1 ) ) (1 (1 )) (1 (1 ) ) (1 (1 ))
λ λφ φ φ φ λδ δφ φ ρ φφ φ φ φ φ δ
ε φ δ ρ δλ λ λ λφ φ φ φδ φ φ φ φ δ φ φ φ φδ δ δ δ
   
+ + − + + −   
  
− + + − 
− − − − −  
− + − +   
− − − − + + − + − − + + − + − −  
        









 
2pi  
2 2 2 2
2 2
2
1
2 2 2 2 2 2
2 2
1 (1 ) 1 (1 )
(1 ) (1 )
1 11 (1 ) 1 (1 )
1 (1 ) 1 (1 )(1 (1 ) ) (1 (1 )) (1 (1 ) ) (1 (1 ))
λ λφ φ φ φ λδ δφ φ ρ φφ φ φ φ φ δ
ε δ ρ δλ λ λ λφ φ φ φδ φ φ φ φ δ φ φ φ φδ δ δ δ
  
+ + − + + −  
 
− + + − 
− − − − −  
− + −  
− − − −+ + − + − − + + − + − −  
      
 
2x  
2 2 2 2
2 2
2
1
2 2
2
1 (1 ) 1 (1 )
(1 ) (1 )
1 (1 ) 1 (1 )
1 (1 )
(1 (1 ))
1 (1 )
λ λφ φ φ φ λδ δφ φ ρ ρ φφ φ φ φ δ
ε λφ φ λδδ φ φφ φ δ
  
+ + − + + −  
 
− + + + − 
− − − −     
−  
 + + −
 + − −
 
− −
  
 
 
3x  ( )
2 2 2 2
2 2
2
21
2 2 2 2 2 2
2 2
1 (1 ) 1 (1 )
(1 ) (1 )
1 11 (1 ) 1 (1 )1
1 (1 ) 1 (1 )(1 (1 ) ) (1 (1 )) (1 (1 ) ) (1 (1 ))
λ λφ φ φ φ λδ δφ φ ρ φ
ε φ φ φ φ φ δφ δ ρ δ ρλ λ λ λδ φ φ φ φδ φ φ φ φ δ φ φ φ φδ δ δ δ
   
+ + − + + −   
  
− + + − 
− − − − −  
− − + − −   
− − − −+ + − + − − + + − + − −  
      





 
 
 

 
 
 
2. Comparing the regimes 
 
When judging various regimes, we let society decide, therefore, when the social loss function 
indicates a lower value, it is considered to be the better policy. A discretional policy is 
denoted to be the optimal, if it can replicate the commitment solution. First, we examine 
results under specific conditions, and then step by step loosing constraints, eventually we 
obtain general results. Keeping in mind that λ  and δ  have inverse relationship to social loss, 
suppose for simplicity that a change in the output gap puts an equal impact on the inflation 
( 1δ = ). Thus, examination implicitly follows the implications of the altering slope of the 
Phillips curve (see Appendix B). 
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2.1. No exogenous persistence ( 0ρ = ) 
 
2.1.1. Only inflation matters ( 0λ = ) 
 
If society focuses solely on inflation variability, the dynamic response of inflation, output, 
price level, and the level of loss, when expectation structure is forward looking, is showed in 
Figure 1 ( 0.5θ =  is used in HT).17 
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Fig. 1. Dynamic response of variables and social loss ( 1φ = , 0λ = , 0ρ = ) 
 
If expectations are forward looking, ITC, the theoretical benchmark implements price 
stability. Along such expectations, PT provides the best performance out of discretional 
solutions; it achieves a total expected loss equal to the benchmark, which is half the size than 
in the case of IT. Due to the forward looking expectations, price level target proved itself to 
be useful, and just like in the case of ITC, only the half of the shock appeared in the inflation 
of the first period ( 10.5ε ). In the case of HT, the inflation of the first period was higher 
( 10.667ε ), the correction in the second period was the half of it (- 10.334ε , since 0.5θ = ), and 
resulted in a moderate price level drift. Conspicuous, that the expected loss was largely 
diminished by the partial presence of price level target. 
 
 
                                               
17
 In the response diagrams, the scales of the ordinates are fixed in order to ease comparability of the different 
cases. 
 9 
Inflation
-1.5
-1
-0.5
0
0.5
1
1.5
1 2 3 4
t
Price level
0
0.5
1
1.5
1 2 3 4
t
Output gap
-2.5
-2
-1.5
-1
-0.5
0
0.5
1
1 2 3 4
t
Social loss
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
1.2
1 2 3 Total
t
(V
ar
(ε)
)
IT
PT
HT
ITC
 
 
Fig. 2. Dynamic response of variables and social loss ( 0φ = , 0λ = , 0ρ = ) 
 
If the expectation structure is purely backward looking, we have totally different result 
(Figure 2). The order turns around with PT performing at its low by creating an expected loss 
double as much as IT does. In this case, ITC means a price level drift equal to the size of the 
shock, which is the same as what happened in the IT regime. What is the root of this? The PT 
regime has to maintain the price level target. Due to the purely backward looking 
expectations, price level target plays no orienting role at all; therefore, the shock gets 
integrated in the inflation of the first period at maximum extent. In the second period, a price 
rise of the same magnitude would occur due to lagged pricing. The task of the monetary 
authority is eventually to neutralize this inflationary pressure and to undo the price rise of the 
previous period, which means higher inflation volatility compared to IT.18 
Inflation expectations perceivable in reality are not characterized by these extreme 
structures.19 In order to conduct comprehensive analysis, let us take a look at Figure 3, which 
shows the losses of regimes as a function of expectations, more precisely as the degree of 
forward lookingness; ˆ( )S φ , ( )S φ , ( )S φ , and ( )S φ  denote social loss indicated under IT, PT, 
HT, and ITC, respectively. (Variability of inflation and output gap are discussed extensively 
in Chapter 3. Note that social loss reflects the linear combination of the variance of inflation 
and output gap.)20 
                                               
18
 At the same time, it means higher output gap volatility, too, but now it has no relevance for society. 
19
 Chapter 4 provides a broader empirical outlook. 
20
 Proof: The two variables are 
1t tcpi ε=  and 
1t tx d ε= , 
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Fig. 3. Social loss ( 0λ = , 0ρ = ) 
 
This figure shows that, depending on expectations, what discretional policy is more adequate 
and where they are optimal. With the circumstances given, expected loss of IT is not 
influenced by the expectations, and in the case 0φ = , its performance coincides with the one 
perceived by ITC. The more forward looking economy actors are, the better PT performs, and 
in the case of 1φ = , it will be equivalent with the benchmark. The performance of HT 
depends on the value of θ : if 1θ → , then ( )S φ  embeds in the ( )S φ  curve; if 0θ → , then it 
embeds in the ˆ( )S φ  curve. 
 
Table 3 sums up the order of regimes under various expectations and policy mixes, i.e. when 
it is better to apply a certain policy, and gives the optimality criteria. 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                   
The expected period loss is 
2 2 2 2 2 2
1 1
1 1( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
2 2t t t t t
E L E E x E c E dpi λ ε λ ε   = + = +     
 
Since 2 2 21 1 1 1( ) ( ) ( ) ( )Var E E Eε ε ε ε= − = , the loss will be 
 
2 2 2 21( )
2t t t
E L c dσ λ σ = +   
 
where both terms are the appropriate variances, namely 
 
[ ]1( ) ( ) ( )
2t t t
E L Var Var xpi λ= + . 
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Table 3 
Order of strength and optimal policies 
Expectation Policies Loss 
2
2 1
1
φ θφ < <−  ˆ( ) ( ) ( )S S Sφ φ φ< <


 
2
2
1
φθ φ= −  ˆ( ) ( ) ( )S S Sφ φ φ= <


 
0 2 1φ< < −  
2
20
1
φθ φ< < −  ˆ( ) ( ) ( )S S Sφ φ φ< <


 
2 1φ = −  θ∃  ˆ( ) ( ) ( )S S Sφ φ φ< =   
2
2
2 1 1
1 2
φ φ θφ φ
− −
< <
− +
 
ˆ( ) ( ) ( )S S Sφ φ φ< <   
2
2
2 1
1 2
φ φθ φ φ
− −
=
− +
 
ˆ( ) ( ) ( )S S Sφ φ φ= <   2 1 1φ− < <  
2
2
2 10
1 2
φ φθ φ φ
− −
< <
− +
 
ˆ( ) ( ) ( )S S Sφ φ φ< <  
0φ =  0θ =  ˆ( ) ( )S Sφ φ=  
0 1φ< <  θ φ=  ( ) ( )S Sφ φ=  
1φ =  1θ =  ( ) ( )S Sφ φ=  
In the case of IT or PT with the circumstances given, the reproduction of the commitment 
solution will occur only at the two extreme expectation structures. In the case of hybrid 
expectation, HT stands for solution. With the proper balance between price level and inflation 
target, it is possible to create a result that is equivalent to ITC under every value of φ . With 
the current criteria given, emphasis shall be taken on price level target exactly at the same 
extent as the degree of forward lookingness (e.g. see Figure 3). What stated above can be seen 
graphically in Figure 4. 
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Fig. 4. Order of strength and optimal policies 
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The grey curve shows what mix leads IT and HT to equivalent results. The black curve means 
the same relation between PT and HT. The area above the grey curve means the unambiguous 
dominance of IT. The area below the grey curve and above the black curve shows the 
superiority of hybrid policies over IT and PT regimes, while the area below the black curve 
means the unambiguous superiority of PT. The relative effectiveness of PT and IT depends on 
expectations, with the previous one being a better option if the ratio of forward looking 
expectations is a bit over 40 per cent ( 2 1φ > − ). ITC can be achieved in any expectation 
structure, and optimal solutions fall on the diagonal. 
One important question left to be cleared is the relation of HT policies under different 
expectation structures, which is shown in Figure 5. 
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Fig. 5. Social loss under different policy mixes ( 0λ = , 0ρ = ) 
 
In the New Keynesian case, adding some price level target to an IT loss function results in a 
notable decline in social loss. In the extremely backward looking case, incorporating some 
inflation target into a PT loss function decreases the loss as well; however, this latter decline 
is more significant, as we put more and more weight on the newly incorporated target. These 
relations are not linear, since the gains are decreasing. Moreover, concerning expectations, 
linearity does not stand either: if expectations of the economic actors shift from fully 
backward looking behaviour, it ameliorate the general performance of HT more, than a same 
shift would do it close to the fully forward looking case.21 
 
 
 
 
                                               
21
 As presented previously, Figure 5 also reveals that in the forward looking case it is PT, in the backward 
looking case it is IT, and in the mean it is HT with equal weight on price level and inflation target, that is the best 
discretional policy, and that different set of expectations affect performance of PT the most, and do not affect IT 
at all. 
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2.1.2. Multigoal society ( 0λ > ) 
 
First, we are about to examine a society that considers the inflation and the output gap 
divergence from their preferred values equally harmful ( 1λ = ). 
We knew right at the beginning that the dynamic response of the variables of the three 
discretional regimes will not change compared to the preceding but their social loss levels. 
However, in the case of ITC the optimal values of variables and the loss are also affected, 
since it considers ‘real’ social preference. 
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Fig. 6. Dynamic response of variables and social loss ( 1φ = , 1λ = , 0ρ = ) 
 
In the case of purely forward looking expectations, inflation in the first period became higher 
than in the case of 0λ =  ( 10.667ε  instead of 10.5ε ), and inflation shock was adjusted only 
partially (- 10.334ε  instead of - 10.5ε ), since the opening of the output gap was dampened. The 
result is a price level drift that is less than the shock itself ( 10.334ε ). 
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Fig. 7. Dynamic response of variables and social loss ( 0φ = , 1λ = , 0ρ = ) 
 
In the case of fully backward pricing, the total shock builds into price level in the first period, 
and in the second period, ITC neutralized inflation persistence thereof only partially (-
10,334ε ), i.e. there was no correction, which resulted in a further price level drift. 
Figure 8 shows the social loss in the environment of the hybrid Phillips curve. 
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Fig. 8. Social loss ( 1=λ , 0ρ = ) 
 
The order of strength among regimes has been reset. The disadvantages of the PT regime are 
plainer to see, especially when expectations are more and more backward looking. The reason 
behind is that the readjustment of the price level needed heavy intervention in the case of 
significant endogenous persistence: larger output gap had to be made, which is now penalized 
by the social loss function. Adding the importance of output gap volatility, IT has gained a 
relatively better position over PT. What even more important is that PT cannot replicate the 
commitment solution under any expectation structure. 
However, the reproduction of the benchmark result by IT exists on a theoretical level. With 
any given λ , there is only one expectation structure where IT can perform this, i.e. only by 
certain dot pairs ( , )′ ′λ φ . The probability of the existence of a proper pair is zero, while there 
are very limited instruments of the economic policy to influence these variables. 
HT could mean a solution to this dilemma. This regime has the advantage to unbind the 
constraints of the expectation structure by using weighted inflation and price level target mix, 
thus only the social preference weight remains the independent variable. Under certain 
circumstances by picking the right θ , it enables to achieve the ITC solution at a positive 
output gap preference weight, note, without having an output gap weight in the central bank’s 
loss function differing from zero. The freedom of the hybrid policy is limited by the position 
of IT, which means that with a given λ , it is capable to do so where 
 
 
1 1ˆ ( ) ( ) 1S Sφ φ φ− −′ ′= < ≤ . (8) 
 
If the significance of the variance of the output gap becomes higher, the lower bound of 
inequality (8) will be satisfied by higher values of φ , which means that the latitude of HT 
keeps on diminishing, analytically 
 
 
1 1ˆ ( ) ( ) 1S Sφ φ− −′ ′= → , when λ → ∞ , 
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and so it is necessary that 0→θ . The rising of λ  enables HT to achieve the ITC solution on 
a shrinking (more and more forward looking) spectrum. To sum it up: in the range of φ  where 
inequality (8) is not satisfied, IT is the suboptimal policy, and in the range of φ  satisfying the 
inequality, HT is the optimal policy, since ˆ0 : (1) (1)S Sλ∀ > ≠ .22 The following table 
summarizes optimal policies. 
 
Table 4 
Optimal policies ( 0λ > , 0ρ = ) 
Expectations Best policy Remarks 
1 1ˆ0 ( ) ( )S Sφ φ φ− −′ ′< < =  IT, suboptimal ˆ(0) (0)S S≠ , if 0λ >  
1 1
ˆ ( ) ( )S Sφ φ φ− −′ ′= =  IT, optimal  
1 1
ˆ ( ) ( ) 1S Sφ φ φ− −′ ′= < <  HT, optimal ˆ(1) (1)S S→ , if λ → ∞  
Considering what has been said before, let us take a look again at Figure 8. It shows that in 
the case of purely forward looking expectations ( 1=φ ) and that of inflation and output gap 
volatility having the same importance to society ( 1=λ ), the optimal combination to achieve 
the theoretical minimal loss is 0.5θ = . Generally, in the in the fully forward looking case, the 
optimal values of θ  belonging to the various values of λ  are 
 
 
2 2 2 3 2
3 2
2 6 4 (2 6 4) 4( 4 5 2)(2 )
2( 4 5 2)
λ λ λ λ λ λ λ λθ λ λ λ
+ + + + + − + + + +
=
+ + +
, (9) 
which is shown in Figure 9.23 
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Fig. 9. Optimal policies at various social preference weights ( 1=φ , 0ρ = ) 
                                               
22
 With elementary calculus ˆ(1) (1)S S= , if λ=-2. 
23
 Naturally, this relation can be derived at any other values of φ  satisfying inequality 8. 
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This figure highlights that the rise of the preference weight, particularly by its lower values, 
(and/or the decline in the slope of the Phillips curve) drastically worsen the usefulness of 
incorporating significant price level target aside inflation target into the loss function of the 
central bank, even in the forward looking case. The reason is that society does not like larger 
output gap variability needed for eliminating price level drift, and this is even more obvious 
with the increase of lagged pricing at the expense of forward looking behaviour, as the 
interventions required are even heavier. Two of the previous results can also be seen from a 
different perspective. In the New Keynesian case without exogenous persistence, PT can 
replicate ITC only if society does not concern the output gap variability, and under same 
expectations, IT can not replicate the commitment solution if preference weight tends to 
infinity (and/or the slope of the Phillips curve tends to zero). 
 
2.2. The role of the exogenous persistence ( 0>ρ ) 
 
In the previous analysis, the exogenous persistence effect of the shock was not considered. 
There is the question whether its presence changes our previous results, and if it does, then 
what way. One should not forget that the already perceived lagged inflation is endogenously 
determined, while supply shock persistence is exogenously given, since it is not affected by 
policy. Let us see what our model indicates with moderate persistence ( 0.5ρ = ). 
 
2.2.1. The output does not matter ( 0λ = ) 
 
First, the more simple case is considered when society cares about the inflation variability 
only. 
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Fig. 10. Dynamic response of the output gap ( 1φ = , 0φ = ) 
 
Figure 10 shows the dynamic response of the output gap only, since there was no quality shift 
at all when compared to the case without persistence ceteris paribus. If we take a look again at 
the results of the model (Table 2), exogenous persistence effects can apparently be identified 
in every solution. The effect of the exogenous persistence increasing inflation would have 
been 10.5ε  in the second period, and 10.25ε  would have been in the third period. Every 
regime had to intervene at a higher scale when compared to the case without persistence: its 
absolute value is as much as higher the persistence would have contributed to the increase of 
inflation, thus the result is the shifting of the output gap into negative direction. Since it does 
not affect losses, they are equivalent to the case without persistence. 
 
 18 
2.2.2. The output gap matters, too ( 0λ > ) 
 
Again, suppose that the inflation and output gap variability have the same importance to 
society, 1=λ . It is clear that this change affects only the dynamics of the variables of ITC 
and, naturally, the loss of all regimes. 
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Fig.11. Dynamic response of variables and social loss ( 1φ = , 1λ = , 0.5ρ = ) 
 
In the case of fully forward looking expectations, although inflation is set higher by ITC when 
compared to the case without persistence ceteris paribus, its increase is smaller than the 
pressure from persistence (the inflation in the first period is 10.8667ε  instead of 10.667ε  , and 
in the second it is - 10.1667ε  instead of - 10.334ε ). The reason behind this is that commitment 
solution has countered the shock by widening the output gap (- 10.667ε  instead of - 10.334ε ). 
Eventually, price level moved higher, although by the two third of the persistence effect of the 
first period only, when compared to the price level drift without persistence. 
 
 19 
Inflation
-1.5
-1
-0.5
0
0.5
1
1.5
1 2 3 4
t
Price level
0
0.5
1
1.5
1 2 3 4
t
Output gap
-2.5
-2
-1.5
-1
-0.5
0
0.5
1
1 2 3 4
t
Social loss
0
1
2
3
4
5
1 2 3 Total
t
(V
ar
(ε)
)
IT
PT
HT
ITC
 
 
Fig. 12. Dynamic response of variables and social loss ( 0φ = , 1λ = , 0.5ρ = ) 
 
In the case of purely backward looking inflation expectations, the shock appears in the price 
level of the first period completely in the commitment solution. In the second period, ITC 
neutralizes around the three fourth of the inflation pressure originating from exogenous 
persistence and backward pricing (which is 11.5ε ). This means that the drift in price level is 
larger by one sixth of the persistence effect when compared to the case without persistence. 
In order to analyze the hybrid expectation structure, let us take a look at Figure 13. 
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Fig. 13. Social loss ( 1λ = , 0.5ρ = ) 
 
Larger interventions due to the exogenous persistence have the similar loss effect as if the 
importance of the output gap variance ( λ ) had increased (and/or the slope of the Phillips 
curve had declined). Contrary to the case without persistence, ITC cannot be reproduced by a 
discretional regime at all if the increase of λ  goes beyond a certain point, while this point 
appears during the persistence increase at a lower λ , i.e. its higher value nullifies the latitude 
of monetary policy concerning hybrid strategies sooner. The opportunity for HT is limited by 
the position of the IT which is affected by the change in λ  and ρ  at different scale. 
Theoretical optimum can be achieved by HT, where 
 
 
1 1ˆ ( ) ( ) 1S Sφ φ φ− −′ ′= < ≤  (10) 
 
can be satisfied. If 1λ ≤ , solutions always exist under any degree of persistence; however, if 
1λ > , inequality (10) can not be satisfied unconditionally. This criterion implicitly 
determines a proper subset W  of the vector space 0{ ( , , ) : , , }V x λ ρ δ λ ρ δ+ += = ∈ ∈  , 
where IT and HT have the capability to implement the commitment solution. Combinations 
generating the boundary of this subset in the critical interval of 1λ >  are satisfying equality 
(11), 
 
 
2 2 2 3 2
3 2
4 2 (4 2 ) 4( 2 )(2 )( )
2( 2 )g
λ λ λ λ λ λ λρ λ λ λ
+ + + − + +
= =
+
. (11) 
 
In such situations when the economy is characterized by these combinations, only IT can 
reproduce the benchmark solution, namely in the fully forward looking case. Beyond this 
boundary, none of the discretional regimes can achieve ITC, and in that case, it is IT that 
provides the best policy, even though suboptimal one only, in the whole range of 
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expectations. Table 5 summarizes optimal policy criteria, while Figure 14 shows the 
abovementioned subset. 
 
Table 5 
Optimal policies ( 0λ > , 0ρ > ) 
Expectations Best policy Criteria Remarks 
1 1ˆ0 ( ) ( )S Sφ φ φ− −′ ′≤ < =  IT, suboptimal 
1 1
ˆ ( ) ( )S Sφ φ φ− −′ ′= =  IT, optimal 
1 1ˆ ( ) ( ) 1S Sφ φ φ− −′ ′= < ≤  HT, optimal 
ρ∀ , if 1λ ≤ ; 
( )gρ λ< , if 
1λ >  
If ( )gρ λ=  and 1φ = ,  
IT is optimal 
( ˆ(1) (1)S S= ); 
If ( )g λ ρ< , IT is 
suboptimal, 0 1φ≤ ∀ ≤  
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Fig. 14. Boundary of subset W ( 1δ = ) 
 
Figure 14 shows, if 1λ ≤ , then persistence per se is not a constrain at all for the existence of 
optimal hybrid policies.24 For instance, in the case of 0.5ρ = , HT has a relevance, if 2λ < , 
which means that it is capable, through a narrowing expectation range with the increase of λ  
at the same time, to achieve the theoretical optimum. If 2λ = , then ˆ(1) (1)S S= , i.e. only IT 
can reproduce ITC, and only in the New Keynesian case; however, if 2λ > , then none of the 
discretional regimes is capable of that. Hence, IT gives the solutions closest to ITC 
throughout the whole expectation spectrum. 
 
 
                                               
24
 At 1λ = , ˆ(1) (1)S S=  would require 1ρ = , what can not be. 
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3. Inflation and output gap variability 
 
The presented model always indicates higher output gap variability in the case of PT related 
to IT, however, it shows lower inflation variability under certain circumstances.25 The reason 
is the implementation of the transmission lag. In the fully forward looking case, IT creates no 
output gap in the period following the supply shock, as it has no reason, while PT must 
shepherd the price level back to its targeted value. It is more straightforward in those cases, 
where the expectations are more and more backward looking, since the expectation driving 
effect of using a price level target deteriorates more and more, hence the initial jump in 
inflation is higher.26 
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Fig. 15. Inflation and output gap variability, 0λ = , 0ρ =  and 1λ = , 0.5ρ =  ( 1δ = ) 
 
The output gap variability moves inversely to the slope of the Phillips curve which has the 
same effect under IT and PT, and moves along with exogenous inflation persistence, but, on 
the contrary, this latter one does not have the same impact on IT and PT. According to PT, it 
causes additional intervention requirement in period 2, however, it helps to counter the 
backward pricing effect for one period after the deflationary phase. On the other hand, when 
expectations are rather forward looking, it may mean cost in every period. The situation in the 
                                               
25
 The simulation of Fillion and Tetlow (1994) also reported that PT creates lower inflation variability but higher 
output gap variability than IT, but as Svensson (1999) already noted, they did not give explanation beyond that 
these results indicate strong serial correlation of the price level. 
26
 Considering strict targeting, if there was no transmission lag, the output gap variability would be lower in PT 
compared to IT in the fully forward looking case, and would be the same in the fully backward looking case. 
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case of IT is simpler, since exogenous inflation persistence always means additional 
intervention requirement on the whole range of expectations. Thus, with the rise of the 
exogenous persistence, the difference between output gap variances is the dependent of these 
full impacts on output gap variability (see Figure 16). 
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Fig. 16. Differences in output gap variability of IT and PT, ( 1δ = ) 
 
 
4. Empirical outlook 
 
The estimation of Fuhrer and Moore (1995) using a sticky price model showed near 
equivalent forward and backward looking behaviour, while Galí and Gertler (1999) 
demonstrated that the forward looking behaviour is more dominant (0,68-0,87).27 Also, Galí 
and Gertler (1999) emphasized the sluggish behaviour of real marginal cost, which might be a 
good explanation of the slow inflation response to output gap, hence, the high and costly 
output gap needed for making inflation move. This flattening tendency of the Phillips curve is 
also demonstrated by Sbordone (2007). She found that global competition affecting US 
economy decreases the sensitivity of inflation to marginal cost. Continuous supply shocks due 
to oil and food prices seem to be a long course, too. Backward pricing, declining slope of the 
Phillips curve, and persistent cost push shocks are not too favourable background for targeting 
a constant price level, though could be for hybrid policy according to the presented model.28 
However these conditions are not petrified. In the 1960s-70s, uncertainty around monetary 
transmission was high, since the lag was long and variable. That was the reason why 
                                               
27
 Galí and Gertler (1999) argued that therefore the New Keynesian Phillips curve gives a good first 
approximation of the inflation dynamics. Rudd and Wheelen (2005) and Lindè (2005) claimed that it is a result 
of specification bias, while Kurmann (2005) pointed out the uncertainty around the estimation procedure. In a 
recent paper, Galí et al. (2005) stand out for their results. 
28
 The latitude and applicability of hybrid policy is also restricted by all of these tendencies, and at the same 
time, as Cechetti and Kim (2003) noted, this regime has the disadvantage that a hybrid target is very hard to be 
communicated, which would be a key issue of conducting credible monetary policy. 
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Friedman (1968) emphasized the impossibility of price stabilization, but added that it could be 
otherwise, if the “understanding of monetary phenomena advances”. Au contraire, it was not 
the case at the beginning of the 20th century. According to the observation of Fisher (1912) on 
the US economy, the monetary transmission reliably exerted its full effect on prices in 3 
month, again contrary to the experienced 1.5-2 years of our time. Another prevailed argument 
of our days is that creating deflation leads to financial instability, and so price level targeting 
is not favourable, which was emphasized by Fisher (1994) and Mishkin (2001). However, all 
of these phenomena may reflect the policy-affected economy of its era. The Swedish episode 
of the 1930’s showed that maintaining a constant price level target is feasible without falling 
into the pit of the zero bound problem. As Berg and Jonung (1999) emphasized the lessons 
learned, price level targeting helped to raise inflation expectations despite the persistent 
worldwide deflationary pressure during the Great Depression. This historical evidence is a 
fine support of Lucas critique, as the change in the policy modified the expectations of the 
economic actors, and so it is revealed that some of the ‘axiomatic causalities’ were only the 
manifest of a reigning paradigm.29 
 
 
5. Conclusions 
 
In the presented three-period steady state to steady state framework it is showed that strict 
inflation, price level and hybrid targeting can all achieve theoretical optimum, inflation 
targeting with commitment, under certain circumstances. Considering transmission lag, the 
model indicated that price level targeting always creates higher output gap variability than 
inflation targeting, whereas the relation in inflation variability, and so the social loss 
implication, is an open issue, sensitively depending on the conditions. 
Inflation targeting proved far more robust than price level targeting, while hybrid targeting 
had the best adaptability. It is showed that without exogenous inflation persistence, inflation 
targeting and hybrid targeting can always reproduce commitment solution on a descending, 
more and more forward looking range of expectations with the rise of the social preference 
weight on the output gap (and/or with the decline of the slope of the Phillips Curve), while in 
the most general and realistic case, the existence of exogenous persistence makes the 
possibility of implementation to the function of the social preference weight (and/or the slope 
of the Phillips curve). 
The examination demonstrated the non-linear interrelation of economic and policy 
parameters. Depending on the policy framework, the impact of parameters on inflation 
variability, output gap variability and social loss manifest in a different way, moreover, not 
always in monotonic fashion. 
 
 
Appendix 
 
A. Model solutions 
 
A.1. Inflation targeting with commitment 
 
The expected loss to be minimized subject to the constraints given by Phillips curve is 
                                               
29
 Mishkin (2006) reconsidered his earlier sceptical view contemplating the case of Japan, and concluded that PT 
can be favourable in an economy experiencing deflationary pressure. Models of Eggertson and Woodford (2003) 
and Wolman (2005) showed that implementing rules in order to maintain stationary price level helps to evade 
hitting the zero bound. 
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E x xpi pi λ λ + + +  . Since the central bank has full credibility, it endogenizes 
inflation expectations during its optimizing process, thus 1| 1t t tpi pi+ += . The Lagrangian is 
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whose first order conditions are 
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Simple rearrangements and substitutions lead to the optimal solutions. 
 
A.2. Inflation targeting 
 
The expected loss to be minimized is 
 
2
1
1
2t t ii
E pi
∞
+
=
  ∑  
 
which is 2 21 2 3
1
2
E pi pi +   in period 1, and 
2
2 3
1
2
E pi    in period 2. Inflation values minimizing 
the loss are 
 
2 0pi =  and 3 0pi = . 
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According to equations (6) and (7), 1| 0t tpi + = . With simple substitutions into the conditions 
given by the Phillips curve, solutions are obtained. 
 
A.3. Price level targeting 
 
The expected loss to be minimized is 
 
2 2
1 1 1
1 1 ( )
2 2
t i
t t i t j
i i j
E p E pi
∞ ∞ +
+
= = =
=∑ ∑ ∑  
 
which is 2 2 2 21 2 3 1 1 2 1 2 3
1 1 ( ) ( )
2 2
E p p E pi pi pi pi pi   + = + + + +     in period 1, and 
2
2 1 2 3
1 ( )
2
E pi pi pi + +   in period 2. Inflation values minimizing the loss are 
 
1 2 0pi pi+ =  and 3 0pi = . 
 
According to equations (6) and (7), *1|t t t tp p ppi + = − = − . With simple substitutions into the 
conditions given by the Phillips curve, solutions are obtained. 
 
A.4. Hybrid targeting 
 
Using the transformation of 
 
1 1(1 )t t t t t t t tp p pθ θ pi θ θpi pi θpi pi θ− −+ − = + + − = − , 
 
the loss function to be minimized is 
 
2 2
1 1 1
1 1( ) ( )
2 2
i
t t i t t t i j
i i j
E p Epi θ pi θ pi
∞ ∞
+ +
= = =
+ = +∑ ∑ ∑  
 
which is 2 2 2 21 2 1 3 2 2 1 3 1 2
1 1( ) ( ) ( ) ( ( ))
2 2
E p p Epi θ pi θ pi θpi pi θ pi pi   + + + = + + + +     in period 1, 
and 22 3 1 2
1 ( ( ))
2
E pi θ pi pi + +   in period 2. Inflation values minimizing the loss are 
 
2 1 0pi θpi+ =  and 3 0pi = . 
 
According to equations (6) and (7), 1| 1(1 )t t tppi θ pi+ = − − . With simple substitutions into the 
conditions given by the Phillips curve, solutions are obtained. 
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B. Social preference weight and the slope of the Phillips curve 
 
Considering the commitment solution, one can recognize the relation scheme30 
 
1 kλδ δ
=
+
 
 
in the case of the output gap, and 
 
kδ δλδ δ
=
+
 
 
in the case of inflation. 
What does that mean? If the output gap does not matter at all ( 0λ = ), and the central bank 
should focus on the inflation target alone, then only the slope of the Phillips curve determines 
the size of the output gap necessary to achieve the goals. If it is not just the inflation, but the 
output gap matters ( 0λ > ), then it can be seen that the rules reduce the output level 
divergence from the potential one. 
Considering the inflation rule, there are equivalent outcomes in any cases where 0λδ = , since 
1kδ =  at the same time. If δ = ∞ , then the Phillips curve is vertical, which means that the 
central bank can make, with minimal intervention, the inflation move infinitely, and therefore, 
the preference weight on the output gap is not relevant. If 0λ = , the inflation rule is 
independent from the slope of the Phillips curve, as the scale of the intervention does not 
matter. These situations result in the same social loss; the only difference between the two 
cases can be captured in the size (and the variability) of the output gap. In discretional 
regimes, since they are strict targeters, the social loss implications of these relations are more 
straightforward. 
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